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INTRODUCTION

Under the financial strain caused by the recent economic recession,
many states have struggled to raise enough revenue to cover costs.'
Accordingly, many states have begun to pass so-called "Amazon" tax
laws ("Amazon laws").2 The purpose of these laws is to impose sales
and use tax collection or reporting obligations on out-of-state online
companies, such as Amazon.com (Amazon), on purchases by in-state
buyers. However, in Quill v. North Dakota,3 the United States Supreme
Court placed significant limitations on the ability of states to impose tax
collection obligations on out-of-state vendors.4 Under Quill, the seller
must have a "nexus" with the taxing state that does not violate either the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 or the Commerce
Clause6 of the United States Constitution.
The challenge of applying traditional concepts of sales tax
collection obligations in the age of e-commerce is that most online8
companies do not have a significant physical presence in every state.
Companies like Amazon use somewhat extreme tactics to avoid the
burden and expense of collecting sales taxes in numerous jurisdictions by
engaging in "entity isolation." 9 Entity isolation means that the parent
corporation establishes a number of subsidiary companies to perform
specific functions in a state.' 0 Because these subsidiaries are legally
distinct from the parent company, the parent company never establishes a
physical presence in-state and is thus not obligated to collect sales tax."
Although entity isolation may have been taken to its extreme limit
by e-retailers, the difficulty of requiring out-of-state companies to collect

1. See Jeanine Poggi, Amazon Sales Tax: The Battle, State by State, THE STREET
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://bit.ly/i3fvwq.
2. See Saul Hansell, Amazon Sues Over State Law on Collection of Sales Tax, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2008), http://nyti.ms/JdsJrs. These laws are known as "Amazon" laws

because they largely are targeted at Amazon.com, one of the largest e-retailers. Id.
3. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
4. Id. at 298.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
8. Daniel Tyler Cowan, New York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet:
Amazon.corn v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1428 (2010).
9. See generallyMichael R. Gordon, Up the Amazon Without a Paddle: Examining
Sales Taxes, Entity Isolation, and the "'Affiliate Tax," 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 299, 306-08
(2010) (using the model of Amazon.com to explain basic principles of entity isolation).
10. Id.
11. Id.

2012]

QUIBBLING WITH QUILL

sales taxes is not unique to online vendors. Historically, states have been
unable to impose sales or use tax collection obligations on out-of-state
companies such as catalog or mail-order companies. 12 The states'
increased interest in collecting sales taxes from e-retailers is largely due
to the explosion in e-commerce, which has grown tremendously in recent
years. 13 This explosion has caused states to lose potentially millions of
dollars every year in sales tax revenue.1 4 States are not alone in their
desire to have e-retailers collect sales taxes, as local brick-and-mortar
stores have complained that online companies have an unfair competitive
advantage because e-retailers are able to offer goods at lower prices by
not collecting sales taxes. 15 Therefore, as states have scrambled to raise
additional revenue due to the "Great Recession" and to help local
businesses become more competitive, many state legislatures have
passed Amazon laws. 16
In general, the Amazon laws are designed to require e-retailers to
collect sales taxes. 17 States have typically followed two models.18 The
first is the New York model, which broadens the definition of what
constitutes physical presence, or nexus, in the state to include the
"affiliates" of e-retailers.19 Most states passing Amazon laws follow this

12. E.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967); see infra
Part III.A (discussing due process requirements).
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales; 4th Quarter
2011, at 1, available at http://l.usa.gov/KnvYkd. Total e-commerce sales in 2011 was
estimated to be $194.3 billion, increasing approximately 16.1% from 2010. Id. Overall,
e-commerce sales accounted for 4.6% of total retail sales. Id.
14. Donald Bruce et al., State andLocal Government Sales Tax Revenue Losses from
Electronic Commerce, ii, (May 18, 2009), http://bit.ly/8P2VUa.
15. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 300.
16. See Poggi, supra note 1.
17. E.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011 through L.2011).
18. There is a third model for states to collect sales taxes from out-of-state retailers
known as the "affiliate nexus" theory, which essentially ignores entity isolation and
examines the subsidiary and parent companies to see if there is a common ownership and
a unitary business enterprise. Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33
CARDOZO L. REv. 1803, 1805-06, 1813 (2012). The "affiliate nexus" theory is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For more information on this theory, see David Gamage &
Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forwardfor State Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L.
Rev. 483, 520-22 (2012); see also N. R. Kleinfield, Amazon to Build New Jersey
Warehouses and Collect State Tax, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012), http://nyti.ms/Me7etf.
19. N.Y. TAX LAW § I 101(b)(8)(vi). Amazon's Associate's program, for example,
allows participants, known as "Associates," to maintain links to merchandise on
Amazon.com, and Amazon compensates these Associates with a percentage of the
proceeds of sales that result from users clicking these links and making purchases.
Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009), aff'd as modified 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also
Amazon.com, Associates Program Operating Agreement
(Jul. 1, 2012),
http://bit.ly/LkEpdl [hereinafter Operating Agreement].
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approach.2" The second is the Colorado model, which requires out-ofstate e-retailers to notify customers of the obligation to pay use taxes
and, in some cases, provide information to the state's department of
revenue concerning remote sales made to customers living in the state.21
Remote sellers have fiercely criticized both models and have challenged
the laws' constitutionality.2 2 Ultimately, congressional action will be
required to determine whether states can impose sales tax collection
obligations on out-of-state retailers.2 3
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of sales and use
taxes in the United States and will include a brief introduction to the
"dormant" Commerce Clause. Part III will examine the relevant
jurisprudence concerning the imposition of tax collection obligations on
out-of-state companies, including the requirements of nexus under both
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Part IV will
introduce the various Amazon laws and focus particularly on the recent
laws passed in Illinois, Connecticut, Colorado, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota, and discuss the related legal challenges. Part V will explore the
effectiveness of the Amazon laws and the possibility that Congress will
step in to resolve whether out-of-state retailers must collect and remit
sales taxes to the states. Part VI will provide a conclusion to the issues
presented in this Comment.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF SALES AND USE TAXES AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE

There are two main methods for a state to raise money from the
consumption of personal items: the sales tax and the use tax. Mississippi
implemented the first modern-day sales tax in 1932 to increase state
revenue during the Great Depression.2 4 Today, 45 states, the District of
Columbia, and more than 7,500 local taxing jurisdictions impose a sales
20. E.g., N.Y. TAX § 1101(b)(8)(vi); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6203(c)(5) (West
2011) (effective June 29, 2011, temporarily repealed on September 23, 2011 until
September 15, 2012 or January 1, 2013, depending on enactment of federal law); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2011); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1)
(2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-15(a)(2)
(2011).
21. COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (2011).
22. E.g., Amazon.con, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846; Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012); Performance Mktg.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer, No. 2011-CH-26333, 2012 WL 1986181 (Ill. Cir. May 11, 2012).
23. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing Congressional action).
24. M. DAVID GEFLAND ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A
NUTSHELL 62 (3d ed. 2007). The situation during the Great Depression is in some ways
similar to today where states have seen their revenues decrease significantly due to the
current economic recession.
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tax on the purchase of goods within the state.25 In 2009, sales tax
revenue alone comprised roughly 30 percent of total nationwide state tax
revenue, with some states' reliance being even higher, typically when
they have not levied an income tax.26 The ability of states to collect sales
taxes, however, is somewhat limited by the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.27
A.

Sales Tax

A sales tax is broadly defined as "any tax which includes within its
scope all business, sales of tangible personal property at either the
retailing, wholesaling, or manufacturing stage, with the exceptions noted
in the taxing law.",28 Most commonly, a "sales tax" is equated with the
"retail sales tax," in which the consumer pays the tax and the retailer
remits the tax to the state on a per-item basis. 29 The retailer thus bears
the burden of collecting and remitting the tax, even though the consumer
is responsible for paying the tax.30 Generally, the power of a state to
collect sales taxes is limited to transactions occurring within that state,
and states cannot collect a sales tax on purchases made outside the state,
such as those made through mail orders.3'
B.

Use Tax

To "fill the gap" caused by residents purchasing goods in nontaxing states, most states requiring a sales tax have imposed an
accompanying "compensating use tax," commonly referred to as a "use
tax.",32 A use tax is defined as a "tax imposed upon the privilege of
using, storing, or consuming tangible personal property within the state
or local government boundaries ' 33 that has avoided being subject to a

25. Id.; JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: SALES
AND USE TAXES
19A.01[1], 12.02 (3d ed. 2011).
26. Gordon, supra note 9, at 299. Some state's reliance on the sales tax is as high as
63% of total revenue. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see GEFLAND, supra note 24, at 27-40; see also
infra Part II.C (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause).
28. See R. HAIG & C. SHOUP, THE SALES TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 3 (1934).
29. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, 12.01. Some states require the
vendor to pay the tax as payment for the privilege of engaging in in-state business. Id.
30. GEFLAND, supra note 24, at 66.
31. HELLERSTE[N & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, 16.01[2]. This limit is imposed
by the Commerce Clause. See infra Part II.C (discussing the dormant Commerce
Clause); see also McLeod v. JE Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
32. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, 16.01[2]. States feared the loss
of revenue caused by consumers going to nontax states, and also the loss of business to
local merchants caused by such behavior. Id.
33. GEFLAND, supra note 24, at 80.
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sales tax. 34 Essentially, the use tax is the complement of the sales tax,
imposing the burden of self-assessing and remitting the tax on the
purchaser of the good or service. 5 Most consumers, however, are either
36
unaware of their obligations to pay the use tax or consciously ignore it.
Additionally, states have trouble collecting the use tax because the
transaction occurs beyond state boundaries.37 In theory, the combination
of sales and use taxes creates a seamless web of tax collection that is
easy to administer; in reality, however, states lose much of the revenue
they are due because the use tax is notoriously difficult to collect.38
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
Under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
Congress possesses the express and ultimate power to regulate interstate
commerce. 39 In addition to this affirmative grant of power, the
Commerce Clause also prohibits states from regulating interstate
commerce, even in the absence of congressional action.40 This negative
sweep is known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 4 1 The crucial
question in determining whether a state law violates the dormant
Commerce Clause is to ask if the law either facially discriminates or has
a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce.42
If the law
discriminates against interstate commerce, the burden is on the state to
demonstrate a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.43
If the law does not
34. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, 16.01[2]. Typically the use tax
rate is the same as the sales tax rate. Id. 16.01[4].
35. GEFLAND, supra note 24, at 80-81. The state is able to avoid the impermissible
burden on interstate commerce because the obligation to pay the tax is on the resident of
the state, not on the out-of-state seller. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25,
16.01[2]. Compare McLeod v. JE Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (declaring the
Commerce Clause prevented state from imposing sales tax obligation on out-of-state
company), with General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944)
(upholding use tax collection obligations on out-of-state company).
36. Katherine R. Conroy & Ralph B. Tower, A Study in Use Tax Design, 53 ST. TAX
NOTES 747, 748 (Sept. 14, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Eric A. Ess, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?:
States Seek Solution to Stop E-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 893,
893-94, 897-99 (2006).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753,760 (1967).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
42. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
43. Id. This is the dormant Commerce Clause's "strict scrutiny" test, which is
virtually always fatal. Scott W. Gaylord & Andrew J. Haile, Constitutional Threats in
the E-Commerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on
Amazon Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2011, 2067-68 (2011).
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discriminate, the state must show only that the burden is not "clearly
excessive" in relation to the local benefit. 44 However, once Congress
acts and authorizes the states to burden interstate commerce, such as by
requiring out-of-state companies to collect sales taxes, then no dormant
Commerce Clause issue exists.45
III. JUDICIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES TO IMPOSE TAXING
OBLIGATIONS ON OUT-OF-STATE COMPANIES

In general, the out-of-state vendor must have a sufficient nexus with
the taxing state that complies with both the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution before the state can impose tax collection obligations on the
remote seller.46 The requirements are analytically distinct, though
similar.47 Despite the efforts by the United States Supreme Court in
Quill v. North Dakota to clarify its sales tax obligation jurisprudence,
Quill has arguably caused even greater confusion.48

A.

Due Process Requirements
The focus of the due process nexus requirement has shifted from a

company's physical presence in the state to a more flexible inquiry

regarding the company's "minimum contacts" with the state. 49 This
change resulted from the Supreme Court's shift in personal jurisdiction
analysis from Pennoyer's physical presence test to the more flexible
"minimum contacts" test announced in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington ° and its progeny."
The original rule regarding due process focused on the company's
physical presence within the forum state. In Scripto Inc. v. Carson,52 the

Court stated that there must be "some definite link, some minimum

44.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (noting that "[i]f a

legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree," depending
on the interests at stake).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.

47. Id.
48. See H. Beau Baez III, The Rush to the Goblin Market: The Blurring of Quill's
Two Nexus Tests, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 581, 582, 606 (2006); see also infra Part II.B
(discussing the disagreement among state courts concerning the meaning of physical
presence).
49. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307, 312.
50. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
51. Baez, supra note 48, at 583.
52. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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connection" between the company and the state taxing jurisdiction.53
The Court held that the actions of Scripto's independent contractors
within the forum state were sufficient to meet this test, as the distinction
between independent contractors and full-time employees was "without
constitutional significance., 54 Yet just seven years later, the Court held
in NationalBellas Hess v. Departmentof Revenue 55 that the Due Process
Clause did not support a state imposing a tax on a company whose only
connection to the state was through the U.S. mail.56 The "definite link"
between the forum state and the remote vendor did not exist in such a
case, placing an important restriction on the ability of states to collect
sales taxes on out-of-state purchases.
Although mailing packages to a state is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court held in
National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization57 that
any activity by employees within the state was sufficient to create a
nexus. 58 In this case, National Geographic Magazine had two offices in
California that solicited advertisements for the magazine, but those
offices were not involved with the Society's selling of maps, atlases,
globes, and books from Washington D.C. 59 This presence, nevertheless,
was sufficient for California to require National -Geographic to collect
sales taxes in the state on all transactions.60 In dicta, the Court stated that
having the "slightest presence" in the state would not satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause, but the Court did not further
elaborate.6 '
Finally, in Quill v. North Dakota, the Court rejected the physical
presence requirement under the Due Process Clause and turned the focus
to the idea of "fundamental fairness." 62 In Quill, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires the out-of-state company to purposefully
53. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954)).
54. Id.at 211. The Court on several later occasions stated that Scripto represented
the "furthest constitutional reach of a State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as
its collection agent for a use tax." Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
757 (1967).
55. Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
56. Id. at 758. This has been referred to as the "safe harbor" for out-of-state
vendors. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
57. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
58. Id.at 552, 561 (stating it was irrelevant whether the connections with the state
were related to the activity which gave rise to the tax collection obligation).
59. Id.at 552.
60. Id.at 556.
61. Id. The Court rejected the logic of the California Supreme Court, which relied
on the "slightest presence" test, and instead held that the presence of the two offices was
enough to create a "substantial" presence. Id.
62. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
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direct its business towards the forum state. 63 Consequently, the out-ofstate company does not have to physically enter the forum state to be
subject to taxing obligations in terms of due process. 64 Previous cases
relying on physical presence under the Due Process Clause were thus
overturned.65
The Court instead shifted the physical presence
requirement to the Commerce Clause.66
Proving an out-of-state company purposefully directed its business
towards the state is a lower burden than proving the company has a
physical presence in the state. Accordingly, states can more easily
satisfy the nexus requirement of the Due Process Clause compared to the
more stringent nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause.6 7
B.

Commerce Clause Requirements

Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause's focus is on
physical presence in the state.68 Generally, most courts interpreting the
United States Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence
regarding tax obligations have focused on whether the remote vendor's
contacts meet the bright-line nexus requirements of the Commerce
Clause.69
Though the Court had previously mentioned the Commerce Clause
in out-of-state tax collection obligations in Bellas Hess, the first in-depth
examination of the issue occurred in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.70 There, the Court developed a four-part test to analyze whether a
state tax law is valid under the Commerce Clause. 7 1 Under the test, the
law must be: (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing state; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory toward
interstate commerce; and (4) fairly related to the services provided by the

63. Id. at 306-08.
64. Id. at 308 (holding that if a company engaged in "continuous and widespread
solicitation of business within a State," it had fair warning that it might be subject to tax
collection obligations, citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) and Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
65. Id. ("Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process
Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax,
we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.").
66. See id at 305.
67. See Cowan, supranote 8, at 1433.
68. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312-13 (stating that the "touchstone" of the Commerce Clause
was an interest in maintaining the structure of government by prohibiting states from
unduly burdening interstate commerce).
69. Id. at 313; Baez, supra note 48, at 608.
70. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. Id. at 279.
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state. 72 The Supreme Court retained this test in Quill, while seeking to
The Court
clarify what establishes a "substantial nexus" in a state.
introduced a bright-line test for determining whether a "substantial
nexus" existed: if a company has contacts that fall within the state's
company does not cross
borders, there is a "substantial nexus," but if7 the
4
the border, there is not a "substantial nexus."
Consequently, the Court in Quill stated that it was possible for a
corporation to have "minimum contacts" as required by the Due Process
Clause, but lack the "substantial nexus" as required by the Commerce
Clause. 75 The Court admitted that the bright-line test regarding the
Commerce Clause "appears artificial at its edges," but maintained that
such a rule made tax obligations clear and "encouraged settled
expectations. 76 The Court concluded by reminding Congress that the
federal legislature has plenary power over interstate commerce; therefore
Congress is free to overturn Quill and pass a law allowing states to
burden interstate commerce
by imposing a duty to collect sales tax on
77
out-of-state companies.
Though the Supreme Court's apparent purpose in Quill was to
clarify the meaning of "substantial nexus," the decision has in fact
created greater confusion and has been criticized.78 Many state courts
have struggled to understand and apply the Supreme Court's "substantial
nexus" rule.7 9 Because Quill applies to all out-of-state retailers, most eretailers who lack a physical presence in the state fall under Bellas
Hess's safe harbor and do not have an obligation to collect sales or use
taxes. 80 Some state courts have minimized the concept of substantial.
physical presence, while others have done the opposite.8 '

72.

Id. The first and fourth prongs limit the reach of state taxing authority to ensure

that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
The second and third prongs prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden
onto interstate commerce. Id.
73. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
74. Id. at 313; Baez, supra note 48, at 597.
75.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.

76. Id. at315-16.
77. Id. at 320. The Court admitted that Congress "may be better qualified to
resolve" the problem. Id. "Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when,
and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to
collect use taxes." Id.
78. Baez, supra note 48, at 582; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 18, at 485-86
(stating that a "near scholarly consensus has developed against the Quill framework").
79. E.g., Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 654 N.E.2d 954
(N.Y. 1995); see also In re Appeal of Intercard Inc., 14 P.3d 1111 (Kan. 2000).
80. Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
81. Compare Orvis, 654 N.E.2d 954, with Intercard, 14 P.3d 1111.
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For example, in Orvis Company Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the
State of New York,82 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
"substantial nexus" test from Quill did not require a substantialphysical
presence in the state. In so holding, the court reasoned that (1) the
physical presence standard created a bright-line rule, and (2) companies
have substantially relied on the physical presence rule in conducting
business.83 Requiring a substantial presence would "destroy" the brightline rule by requiring a case-by-case analysis. 84 Instead, the Orvis court
stated that there must be "demonstrably more" than the "slightest
presence" to satisfy the "substantial nexus" test from Quill.85 The court
determined that the companies involved in Orvis had "demonstrably
more" than the "slightest presence" in New York through employees'
infrequent visits to the state. 86
Conversely, in In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 87 the Kansas
Supreme Court stated that the Orvis court "missed the point" that the
United States Supreme Court was attempting to make in Quill.8 8 The
Intercard court interpreted the Quill decision as requiring sufficient
physical presence in the state for the imposition of a use tax collection
duty, and economic presence alone was insufficient to meet this
requirement.89 Therefore, the court held that there was no requirement
for Intercard to collect sales and use taxes, even with Intercard's 11
"incursions" to install card readers in the state. 90 Despite the United
States Supreme Court's best efforts to create a bright-line test in Quill,
the answer as to the required level of physical presence remains
unsettled.

82.

Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y.

1995).
83. Id. at 959. Orvis was a consolidated case involving two out-of-state companies:
Orvis Company Inc. and Vermont Information Processing, Inc. Id. at 955.
84. Id. at 960.
85. ld. at 960-61. The court relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in National Geographic Society, focusing on the Court's discussion of the
"slightest presence" test. Id.; but see supra note 61 (discussing the United States
Supreme Court's rejection of "slightest presence" as the correct test for the due process
nexus).
86. Orvis, 654 N.E.2d at 961-62. The Orvis employees visited New York 12 times
during the audit period and not for the purposes of making sales but rather concerning
shipping and how products were displayed. Similarly, the Vermont Information
Processing employees visited the state to perform free software installations. Id.
87.

In re Appeal of Intercard Inc., 14 P.3d 1111 (Kan. 2000).

88. Id. at 1119.
89. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court also cited to decisions in Florida and Rhode
Island requiring substantial physical presence. Id. at 1120-21.
90. Id. at 1122. The court appeared to believe that a permanent sales force, not just
temporary visits in the state, would be required to satisfy the Commerce Clause's nexus
requirements. Id.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 117:1

AttributionalNexus Requirements

In several cases, the United States Supreme Court has indirectly
referenced the idea of an "attributional" nexus. This concept is closely
tied to that of "substantial nexus" in the Commerce Clause analysis, but
focuses on whether the presence of independent contractors in the state is
sufficient to establish a nexus. 9' Essentially, if the efforts of an
independent contractor are significant for a company to maintain the
company's market in the state, then the state is free to impose a tax
collection obligation on the out-of-state company.92

underlying this taxing freedom

The rationale

is that the distinction between

independent contractors and full-time employees is "without
constitutional significance." 93 The attributional nexus is the key concept
upon which many states rely in imposing sales tax collection obligations
on remote retailers.94
IV.

STATE DESPERATION: THE ADVENT OF THE AMAZON LAWS

As evidenced by the above cases, the issue of states collecting sales

tax from out-of-state companies is neither a new issue nor one unique to
e-retailers.

However, due to declining revenue during the current

economic recession, many states have sought to enact legislation that
forces e-retailers to collect sales taxes. 95 The states argue that they are
96
being unreasonably deprived of revenue they are entitled to receive.

Many states, therefore, have passed various forms of Amazon laws in an
attempt to collect sales taxes they feel e-retailers owe to the state.

91. See generally Sam Zaprzalka, New York's Amazon Tax Not Out of the Forest
Yet: The Battle Over Affiliate Nexus, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (2010).
92. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960) (holding that ten independent
contractors working in Florida were sufficient for the state to require Scripto to collect
sales taxes); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249-50
(1987) (holding that the activities performed by contractors in the state on behalf of the
taxpayer can be enough for tax collecting obligations if the activities are "significantly
associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in th[e] state for
the sales").
93. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211.
94. See infra Part IV.A (discussing New York's Amazon law).
95. E.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011 through L.201 1).
96. Declan McCullagh, Republican Senators Push for Internet Sales Taxes, CNET
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://cnet.co/rNRB7i.
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New York: The First of the Amazon Laws

On April 23, 2008, New York became the first state to pass a law
imposing sales-tax collection obligations on an out-of-state e-retailer.9 7
New York's law has since become the model for many states.9 8 Inorder
to forge a nexus between e-retailers like Amazon and the state, the New
York legislature broadened the definition of "physical presence" by
relying on the attributional nexus mentioned by the United States
Supreme Court. 99 The law provides that "[i]f the seller enters into an
agreement with a resident of [New York] under which the resident, for a
commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential
customers ... to the seller," and the sales generated by the referred
business exceeds $10,000 annually, the seller is presumed to be soliciting
business in the state, and thus is required to collect New York sales
taxes. 00 The presumption may be rebutted "by proof that the resident
with whom the seller has an agreement did not engage in any solicitation
in the state on behalf of the seller that would satisfy the nexus
requirement of the United States constitution [sic]." 10 1 Just two days
after the bill was signed, Amazon challenged the law in New York state
court. 102

Amazon contested the constitutionality of the law as violating the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and the Due Process
Clause, both facially and as-applied to Amazon. 0 3 The trial court held
that Amazon's facial and as-applied challenges under both the
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause lacked merit. 0 4 Although
Amazon did not own any property, have offices, or employ workers in5
program
the state, the court held that because Amazon's Associates
had thousands of New York residents, there was a sufficient nexus to
satisfy the presumption that Amazon had a physical presence in the
97. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation
and Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), aff'd as modified, 913 N.Y.S.2d
129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
98. E.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 6203(c)(5) (West 2011) (effective June 29, 2011,

temporarily repealed on September 23, 2011, see supra note 20 for explanation); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3)
(2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-15(a)(2) (2011).

99. See supra Part Ill.C; Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
100. N.Y. TAX § 1101(b)(8)(vi).
101. Id.
102. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846. The lawsuit was filed on April 25, 2008. Id
3(a), 3(b), Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation
103. Verified Complaint
and Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (No. 601247/08), 2008 WL 5592584.
Amazon also alleged an Equal Protection Clause violation, but this claim is not relevant
for this Comment. Id. 3(c).
104. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
105. See supra note 19 (discussing Amazon's Associates program).
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state. 10 6 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
affirmed the lower court's ruling on Amazon's facial challenges to the
law under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, but reversed and
remanded the case for more fact-finding concerning Amazon's asapplied challenges under both clauses.10 7 In February 2012, Amazon
agreed to discontinue its as-applied challenge to the New York Amazon
law in order to seek an appeal of the0 Appellate
Division's decision with
8
challenge.'
facial
Amazon's
to
regard
B.

Other States Follow New York's Lead

Due to their eagerness for revenue and the success of New York in
passing and defending its law, other states have followed suit in passing
their own Amazon laws, largely copying the language from the New
York law. t0 9 In fact, many Amazon laws rely upon the presence of
independent contractors or affiliates who are residents of the state to
forge a nexus with the out-of-state e-retailer."o In response, Amazon has
cancelled its Associates program in Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Connecticut."' In California, Amazon
sought to overturn the law by a popular referendum but has since stopped
such efforts. Instead, Amazon has reached an agreement with the state to
delay implementation of the sales tax law while Amazon seeks federal
legislation concerning the e-retailer sales tax collection issue, though this
delay expired on September 15, 2012.112

106. Amazon.com, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 844-45, 848-50.
107. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 14546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
108. Stipulation of Discontinuance, Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y Dep 't of Taxation and
Fin., No. 601247/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8 2012); Notice of Appeal, Amazon.com, LLC v.
N.Y Dep't of Taxation and Fin., No. 601247/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22 2012). For more
information on the Amazon case in New York, see generally Zaprzalka, supra note 91
and Gordon, supra note 9.
109. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 2652-117 (2011); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6203(c)(5) (West 2011) (effective June 29,
2011, temporarily repealed on September 23, see supra note 20 for explanation); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 44-18-15(a)(2) (2011). Other states such as Michigan have proposed
Amazon laws that are currently being considered, e.g., H.B. 5004, 96th Legis. Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2011).
110. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-117;
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6203(c)(5); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-15(a)(2).
111. Operating Agreement, supra note 19, § 2.
112. Wendy Kaufman, Amazon Agrees to Collect State Tax in California, NPR (Sept.
9, 2011), http://n.pr/KDM6Od.
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C.

Colorado, Oklahoma, and South Dakota: Variationson a Theme of
the Amazon Law

Compared to the model Amazon law as passed by New York,
Colorado has adopted a unique approach in its attempt to collect sales
and use taxes on out-of-state purchases made by state residents. Instead
of trying to forge a nexus and make the out-of-state companies collect
and remit sales tax, Colorado requires only those companies not
collecting sales tax to submit reports to the Department of Revenue in3
order to enable the state to better collect the use tax from residents.1
The retailers who do not collect sales taxes are required to: (1) notify
their Colorado customers that the retailer does not collect sales tax and
that the purchaser is obligated to self-report and pay the tax to the state
(Transactional Notice), (2) provide customers with an annual report that
details purchases on which customers are obligated to pay use tax
(Annual Purchase Summary), and (3) provide the Colorado Department
of Revenue with an annual report specifying the customers who
purchased goods and did not pay sales tax (Customer Information
Report)."14 The law exempts retailers with less than $100,000 in gross
annual sales in Colorado." 5 The Direct Marketing Association (DMA)
challenged the law, and a federal district court granted the DMA's
motion for summary judgment6 and ordered a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the law."
The approach taken by Oklahoma and South Dakota is similar to
that of Colorado but is not as expansive. Oklahoma's law requires only
out-of-state retailers who are not obligated to collect use taxes to provide
notification on their websites and on invoices sent to customers7
explaining that customers are required to pay use taxes to the state. 1
Furthermore, retailers are forbidden from advertising on their websites
that there is no tax due on purchases made from the retailer for use in the

113.

COLO. REV. STAT. §

39-21-112(3.5)(a) (2011);

COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-

112.3.5(1)(a) (2011).
114. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I), (d)(I)(A), (d)(II)(A); COLO. CODE
REGs. § 39-21-112.3.5(2). The Annual Purchase Summary is only required for customers
who spend more than $500 a year with a particular retailer. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21 112.3.5(3)(c)(i). The Customer Information Report requires the company to report the
customer's name, billing address, shipping address, and total amount of purchases. Id.
§ 39-21-112.3.5(4).
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(B); COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21112.3.5(1)(a)(iii); Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL
1079175, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
116. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *10-11; see infra Part V.A.2 (providing an
overview of the legal challenge and the reasoning of the court in its ruling).
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (2011).
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state.118 South Dakota's law similarly requires non-collecting retailers to
post notice that use tax is to be paid by the in-state purchaser and forbids
retailers from saying that there is no tax due. 1 9 The effect120of these laws
is questionable and will be explored later in this Comment.
V.

WHAT IS THE ENDGAME?

The states' interest in imposing sales tax collection obligations on eretailers has become an increasingly important concern, and it is unlikely
that the states will abandon efforts to implement Amazon laws or similar
measures. 121 The question nevertheless remains whether the options thus
far pursued by the states are constitutional, and, if not, if it is possible for
a state to impose tax collection obligations on an out-of-state e-retailer
under current jurisprudence. It is therefore necessary to examine the
constitutionality of the attempts by states to impose tax obligations on
out-of-state e-retailers like Amazon and proposed Congressional
legislation to determine the appropriate solution.
A.

Amazon Laws: Are They Constitutional?
1.

New York, et al.'s Amazon Law v. Illinois's
Connecticut's: The Problem of Presumption

and

Currently, the New York Amazon law has been found
constitutional, but the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, has
remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the law is
unconstitutional as-applied to Amazon. 122 The court rejected Amazon's
argument that the law created an irrebuttable presumption that Amazon's
Associates solicited business in the state. The court found the
presumption can be rebutted by proof that the affiliate did not solicit any
business in the state on behalf of the seller. 123 This rebuttable
118. Id.
119. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-63-1 to 10-63-9 (2011).
120. See infra Part V.A.2 (concerning the constitutionality of the Colorado and
Oklahoma laws).
121. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Lobbying Congress: 'Amazon' Laws in the Lands of
Lincoln and Mt. Rushmore, 21-24 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law: Jacob Burns Inst.
for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 338, 2011), available at
http://bit.ly/JqbaJu.
122. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 14546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of the facial challenges by Amazon
under both the dormant Commerce and Due Process Clauses, but remanding the related
as-applied challenges). See also supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing
Amazon's appeal of the Appellate Division's decision).
123. Amazon.com, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 139-40 (indicating the existence of a "safeharbor" for e-retailers to prove that its affiliates were not soliciting business in the state
on behalf of the seller, such as a certification from the in-state representative that it did
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presumption, however, does not exist in the Amazon laws passed by
Connecticut and Illinois. 124 The laws in these states in fact create a per
se rule that the seller is presumably obligated to collect sales taxes, with
no chance to rebut the presumption.1 25 This difference is likely fatal to
the Illinois and Connecticut laws.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[s]tatutes creating
permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under
126
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.,
With respect to the Illinois and Connecticut laws, the retailer does not
have a "safe harbor" that would allow it to prove that its affiliates have
not solicited business in the state. 127 The presumption is irrebuttably
established once solicitation by the in-state resident results in cumulative
gross receipts for the retailer in excess of a set amount. 128 In Illinois, the
set amount is $10,000, whereas in Connecticut the amount is only
$2,000.129

Both the Illinois and Connecticut laws fail to meet the Due Process
and Commerce Clause requirements enumerated in Quill because they
lack the rebuttable presumption included in other states' Amazon laws.
Under the Due Process Clause, the laws do not meet the requirements
because they impose tax collection obligations by presuming the out-of30
state retailer is purposefully directing its business towards the state.
The laws rest on the idea that it is the providing of the link that creates
the nexus with the state, not the affiliates' or retailers' activities in
attempting to target the in-state market.13 1 Placing a link on a website,
32
however, does not target a specific market but rather the entire world.
If like New York, the laws presumed that such targeting existed but
simultaneously allowed the presumption to be rebutted, then these laws
would satisfy the due process nexus requirement. This is not the case in

not engage in solicitation); see N.Y. TAX LAW § I 101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011 through
L.201 1); see also sources cited infra note 138.
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2011); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 105/2(1.1) (2011).
125. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1).
126. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,446 (1973) (emphasis added).
127. Compare N.Y. TAX LAW § l101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2011 through L.2011),
with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1).
128. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1).
129. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1).
130. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1992); see infra Part III.A
(concerning the due process analysis); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1).
131. Thomas Donohoe et al., Illinois Bill Would Expand Attributional Nexus Concept
to Untested Lengths, 59 ST. TAX NOTEs 371, 372 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://bit.ly/JuMLvN.
132. Id. at 373.
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Illinois and Connecticut as these states' laws do not allow the e-retailer
to demonstrate that its affiliates are not targeting the in-state market, thus
violating the Quill due process nexus requirement.
Additionally, the Illinois and Connecticut laws do not meet the
dormant Commerce Clause requirements from Quill because the retailer
does not necessarily have a physical presence in the state. 33 These states
attempt to use the in-state affiliates of the e-retailers to forge an
attributional nexus. 134 Again, the problem is that the irrebuttable
presumption makes the law overbroad. There are situations where the
affiliates are not "significantly associated" with the retailer's "ability to
establish and maintain a market" in the state as required by Tyler Pipe
35
Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue.'
Typically, the affiliates only provide links to merchandise on the
retailer's website.136 In such a case, there is no solicitation of business
because the associate merely provides a "click-through" link that
connects the in-state buyer to the retailer.137 The business generated by
these links therefore can hardly be seen as "significantly associated" with
the retailer's ability to "establish and maintain" a market in the state.
Recognizing this distinction, states like New York allow companies
to rebut the presumption of a nexus by providing evidence that the instate resident affiliates' only activity was to provide links to the eretailer's website and that the affiliates did not advertise or solicit
customers by using "flyers, newsletters, telephone calls, or emails.' 3 8
This rebuttable presumption was critical to the New York court's
determination that the law did not facially violate the dormant Commerce

133. Id. at 372-73; Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.
134. CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/2(1.1);
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249-50 (1987); see supra Part III.C (providing an overview of
the attributional nexus requirement).
135. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250.
136. See supra note 19 (concerning Amazon's Associates program); see generally
Operating Agreement, supra note 19.
137. Cowan, supra note 8, at 1434-36; Donohoe, supra note 131, at 372.
138. N.Y. DEP'T OF TAXATION & FIN., New Presumption Applicable to Definition of
Sales Tax Vendor, TSB-M-08(3)S, 2008 WL 2032988 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin., May 8,
2008); Zaprzalka, supra note 91, at 542. The evidence required is contractual language
in the agreement that (1) prohibits solicitation and (2) includes signed certifications from
all the affiliates in the state stating that affiliate did not engage in solicitation. If the seller
does not acquire certification from all its affiliates, the New York Tax Department will
determine whether the presumption is rebutted by weighing the seller's reliance on
certification in light of the Quill nexus standard. N.Y. DEP'T OF TAXATION & FN.,
Additional Information on How Sellers May Rebut the New Presumption Applicable to
the Definition of Sales Tax Vendor as Described in TSB-M-08(3)S, TSB-M-08(3.1)S,
2008 WL 2620914 (N.Y. Dep't Tax. Fin., June 30, 2008); Zaprzalka, supra note 91, at
543.
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Clause.1 39 By failing to include a rebuttable presumption, the Illinois and
Connecticut laws fail to satisfy the Commerce Clause nexus requirement
from Quill.
Another issue with the laws in Illinois and Connecticut is that they
violate the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), which prohibits a
state or political subdivision from imposing "discriminatory taxes on
electronic commerce." 140 A discriminatory tax is defined as any state tax
on electronic commerce that "imposes an obligation to collect or pay the
tax on a different person or entity than in the case of transactions
involving similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished
through other means." 14' The Illinois and Connecticut laws "invite a
challenge under the [ITFA]" because they impose an obligation to collect
use taxes on out-of-state retailers who have in-state affiliates who refer
business via internet sales transactions but not on out-of-state retailers
whose in-state affiliates refer non-intemet related business. 142
Consequently, the Illinois and Connecticut laws both likely violate the
43
ITFA. 1

In fact, a court recently declared the Illinois law unconstitutional
44
because it violates both the dormant Commerce Clause and the ITFA.1
Because the opinion contains no significant analysis, it is impossible to
analyze this decision any further. 145 Nevertheless, the decision does
suggest that the irrebuttable presumption of the Illinois and Connecticut
laws is a key difference rendering these versions of the Amazon law
nonviable alternatives for imposing a sales tax collection obligation on
remote e-retailers.

139. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 139
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see Zelinsky, supra note 121, at 13-15 (explaining the different
roles affiliates play and the impact on the legal analysis); see discussion and sources
supra note 123 and 138.
140. Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, Tit. XI,
§§ 1100-1109, as amended (codified at 47 U.S.C. section 151 note).
141. Id. § l105(a)(2)(iii).
142. Donohoe, supra note 131, at 373; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Permanent Injunction
61, 62, Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer, 2012 WL
1986181 (Ill. Cir. 2012) (No. 201 1-CH-26333).
143. The Connecticut law has not been challenged in a lawsuit, but Amazon has
terminated its Associates' program in the state. See Operating Agreement, supra note 19,
§ 2. See infra note 144 and related text (discussing the fate of the Illinois law).
144. In a brief written order filed on April 25, 2012, the Illinois Circuit Court for
Cook County declared the Illinois law unconstitutional. Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc.
v. Hamer, No. 2011-CH-26333, 2012 WL 1986181 (Ill. Cir. May 11, 2012) (order
granting summary judgment to plaintiff); Matt Schaefer, Court Rules that the Illinois
Internet Affiliate Nexus Law is Unconstitutionaland Violates the Internet Tax Freedom
Act, EYEs ON ECoM L. (Apr. 26, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://bit.ly/OQ7aB3.
145. See Hamer, 2012 WL 1986181. Instead, the above analysis has been retained.
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Colorado, Oklahoma, and North Dakota: The Solution?

As mentioned above, 146 Colorado took a different approach than
other states in drafting its Amazon law. Instead of imposing tax
collection obligations, Colorado imposes a notice and reporting
obligation on remote sellers. 147 Soon after the law went into effect, the
Direct Marketing Association (DMA) 148 challenged the law in federal
court 149 seeking a permanent injunction based only on its Commerce

Clause claims. 5 ° On March 30, 2012, the District Court in Direct Mktg.
Ass 'n v. Huber'5 1 granted the DMA's motion for summary judgment and
issued a permanent injunction barring state enforcement of the Colorado
Amazon law.'

52

In granting the injunction, the District Court's opinion focused on
two issues: (1) whether Colorado's Amazon law discriminated against
interstate commerce, and (2) whether the law placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce. 53
The court held that the law was both
discriminatory and unduly burdensome with regard to interstate
54
commerce.1

55
The court divided its discrimination analysis into two sections.
The first "tier" of the analysis focused on whether the law differentiates,
or discriminates, between in-state and out-of-state retailers. 56 Colorado
argued that there was no discrimination because the law's plain language

146. See supra Part IV.C (discussing Colorado's version of the Amazon law).
147.

COLO. REv. STAT.

§ 39-21-112(3.5)(d) (2011); COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-

112.3.5(2)(a) (2011).
148. The DMA is an "association of businesses and organizations that market
products directly to consumers via catalogs, magazine and newspaper advertisements,
broadcast media, and the internet." Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REBCBS, 2012 WL 1079175 at *2(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
149. See First Amended Complaint, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175
(D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS), 2010 WL 6646489.
150. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *2.
151. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
152. Id. at *10-11. The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction order
against the law. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2011 WL
250556 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2011).
153. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 at
*3-9 (D.Colo. Mar. 30, 2012). In addition to issues surrounding the dormant Commerce
Clause, notice and reporting statutes like Colorado's may have First Amendment
implications, such as privacy, which go beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
detailed analysis, see Gaylord & Haile, supranote 43, at 2084-91.
154. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *10.
155. See supra Part II.C (discussing the differing analysis under the dormant
Commerce Clause depending on whether the law is discriminatory).
156. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *3.
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indicates uniform application to all retailers. 57 However, the court
concluded that this language was merely a "veil" and, therefore, was "too
thin" to be non-discriminatory. 58 The fact that the notice and reporting
obligations were imposed only on out-of-state retailers supported this
conclusion. 159 The court also rejected Colorado's argument that an outof-state retailer has two options: comply with the Amazon law or
voluntarily collect and remit sales taxes to the state.1 60 The court
16
reasoned that, without the Amazon law, no such choice would exist.
Consequently, the court held that the law discriminated against interstate
commerce and would uphold the law only if the second "tier"
requirements were met.162
The second "tier" of analysis examined whether the law advanced a
legitimate local purpose that could not be served by nondiscriminatory
alternatives. 63 Colorado argued three interests: (1) enhancing the state's
ability to recover sales and use tax revenue, (2) promoting the fair
distribution of the cost of government, and (3) promoting respect for and
compliance with tax laws.' 64 The court agreed that these were legitimate
state interests but noted that reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives
existed. 165 Because these alternatives exist, the court found that
Colorado did not meet its burden, and therefore held 166the law to
unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate commerce.
The Huber court also analyzed whether the Colorado law placed an
undue burden on interstate commerce. 67 After a brief overview of the
Quill decision, the court held that the requirements imposed by Colorado
on out-of-state retailers "are inextricably related in kind and purpose to
the burdens condemned in Quill.''168
The court did however
acknowledge that the burden of notice and reporting "is somewhat
157. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 14, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v.
Huber, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS), available at
http://bit.ly/M5jfzg.
158. Huber,2012 WL 1079175, at *4.
159. Id. at *4-5. The court reasoned that in-state retailers are already required to
collect and remit sales taxes. Id.
160. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment supra note 157, at 14-15.
161. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *5.
162. Id. at *6.
163. Id.
164. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment supra note 157, at 22-23.
165. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *6. Examples suggested by the DMA include
adding a line on income tax returns for residents to self-report use tax obligations,
increasing the number of audits of business consumers, and conducting consumer
education and notification programs. Id.
166. Id. at *6-7 (noting that the law is virtually per se invalid because it discriminates
against interstate commerce).
167. Id. at *7.
168. Id. at *8.
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different than the burden of collecting and remitting sales and use
taxes., 169 Nevertheless, the court held that the Colorado law placed an
undue burden on interstate commerce because the burdens are imposed
7 ° Thus, the court permanently enjoined
solely on out-of-state retailers.
17 1
enforcement of the law.
The Huber decision represents a victory for remote sellers, but the
rationale of the decision has been criticized. 72 In regard to the
discrimination analysis, the court appears to suggest that any differential
treatment between in- and out-of-state retailers is constitutionally
impermissible. 173
However, recent United States Supreme Court
decisions have indicated that unconstitutional discrimination under the
Commerce Clause requires more than differential treatment; it also
requires courts to consider whether the state law is a "protectionist
enactment."' 174 If there is a non-protectionist basis for the law, then a
lower standard of review is appropriate. 175
Colorado has a legitimate, non-protectionist interest in collecting
the sales and use taxes owed to the state that go uncollected because the
retailer is out-of-state. 176 Therefore, the strict scrutiny analysis employed
by the Colorado District Court was incorrect. Rather, the court should
have applied the Pike balancing test, which is a lower standard. 177 That
is, the court should have weighed the benefit of the state collecting sales
and use tax revenue against the burden of out-of-state retailers preparing
and sending the required notices to both consumers and the state
Department of Revenue.' 78 Comparing these factors, the benefit to the
state would likely outweigh the burden on companies; but the Pike
balancing test is somewhat unpredictable because the outcome "depends
largely on the 'weights' a court' 79
gives to the perceived benefits and
statute."'
challenged
the
of
burdens

169. Id.
170. Id. at *8-9.
171. Id. at*10-11.
172. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEMN, supra note 25, 19.02[7][b]; Gaylord &
Haile, supra note 43, at 2061. Note that both of these sources discuss the original
preliminary injunction decision, but the court's rationale was similar in both opinions.
173. Huber, 2012 WL 1079175, at *3 (citing Oregon Waste Systems v. Department
of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994)); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note
25, 19.02[7][b].
174. New Energy Co. of nd. v. Limback, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also Gaylord
& Haile, supra note 43, at 2070-71.
175. Gaylord & Haile, supra note 43, at 2070-71.
176. See id at 2073-76 (arguing that the state has such an interest).
177. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the Pike balancing test).
178. For a more in-depth analysis, see Gaylord & Haile, supra note 43, at 2076-84.
179. Id. at 2080-81.
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The undue burden analysis by the Huber court is also problematic.
The court likened the administrative burden of having the retailer collect
the sales tax, which was struck down in Quill, with the notice and
reporting burden, which assists the state in collecting use taxes owed by
in-state customers. 80 Although these burdens may be similar, the notice
and reporting burden seems to be less burdensome on e-retailers.1 8'
However, it is possible that the values represented in Quill could be
implicated if no uniform reporting means existed, imposing substantial
burdens on the out-of-state retailer.' 8
While Colorado's inventive
approach appears to solve the problems associated with New York's
Amazon law, it creates other problems that have proven fatal.
The Amazon laws passed by Oklahoma and South Dakota attempt
to avoid controversy by not imposing a significant burden on out-of-state
retailers, but the laws are largely an exercise in futility and apply too
broadly. Unlike Colorado's Amazon law, the Oklahoma and South
Dakota laws only require a retailer to notify the purchaser that a use tax
must be paid if the retailer is out-of-state.183 With no reporting
requirement by the remote retailers, the laws will likely have a minimal
impact because most consumers 84will ignore the obligation to self-report
purchases subject to the use tax.1
Paradoxically, while these laws may have a weak effect, they reach
much further than either the Colorado or New York versions of the
Amazon law. The Oklahoma and South Dakota laws apply to all out-ofstate sellers, regardless of whether the seller actually engaged in a
transaction with an in-state purchaser.185 These laws also violate the due
process requirements set forth in Quill because, without a transaction,

180.

Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175

at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
"somewhat different." Id.

The court did acknowledge that the burdens are

181. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Siren Song of State Amazon Laws: The Colorado
Example, 7 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law: Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 323, 2011), available at http://bit.ly/L9ruci. The United

States Supreme Court was most concerned with the thousands of taxing jurisdictions and
the burden on the retailer to keep track of all the related rates. E.g., Nat'l Bellas Hess v.
Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967).
182. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25,

19.02[7][b]; Zelinsky, supra note

181, at 6-7.
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-63-1 to 10-63-9
(2011).
184. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Paradoxes of Oklahoma's Amazon Statute: Weak
Duties, Expansive Coverage, Often Superfluous, Constitutionally Infirm, 2, 22-23

(Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law: Jacob Bums Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 315, 2010), availableat http://bit.ly/LjDUOC (stating the best way to

collect tax revenue is to either have a third party, such as Amazon, collect the tax and
remit it to the state, or have the third party report the sale to the state).
185. Id. at 2.
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there is no purposeful direction by the remote retailer to the state.,
Finally, without physical presence, the Oklahoma and North Dakota laws
violate the physical presence standard from Quill.18 7 As a result, these
laws are a "paradox,"'' 88 and states should avoid passing similar laws.
As illustrated by the models of New York, Colorado, and
Oklahoma, states have sought inventive ways to get around the barrier
created by Quill and so far have followed the letter, but not necessarily
the spirit, of Quill.189 Some Amazon laws have been upheld,1 90 some
have been struck down or likely will be struck down, 191 and some are
ineffective.' 92 Even the New York version of the Amazon law stands on
questionable constitutional grounds and depends heavily on the ecommerce website continuing its affiliates program in the state to be
effective. 193 Though states will likely continue the trend of passing
Amazon laws, these laws are not the solution to the problem of collecting
sales tax from out-of-state purchases.
B.

CongressionalResponse and PotentialSolutions

The solution to the out-of-state e-retailer sales tax collection
problem must come from Congress. 194 As the Quill Court stated,
"Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the
States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect
use taxes."' 95 Some scholars have argued that the aggressive approach
taken by the states in passing Amazon laws is an effort to get the United

186. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992); see also supra Part
III.A.

187. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298; Zelinsky, supra note 184, at 3; see also supra Part II1.B.
188. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 184.
189. See supra Parts III, IV.
190. The Amazon law in New York. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. Dep't of
Taxation and Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129, 145-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
191. The Amazon laws in Colorado, Connecticut, and Illinois. See Direct Mktg.
Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175 (D. Colo. Mar. 30,
2012); Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer, No. 201 1-CH-26333 2012 WL 1986181
(I11.Cir. May 11, 2012) (order granting summary judgment to Performance Marketing
Association).
192. The Amazon laws in Oklahoma and South Dakota. See Zelinsky, supra note
184, at 2, 22-23.
193. Gamage & Heckman, supra note 18, at 485.
194. Recently, David Gamage and Devin Heckman proposed a solution involving
states compensating out-of-state retailers for the cost of collecting and remitting sales
taxes, with no Congressional action required. Id. at 486-488, 532. This novel argument
is worthy of further discussion but will not be examined by this Comment.
195. Quill, 504 U.S. at 320. This is because Congress has plenary power over
interstate commerce, See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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States Supreme Court to overturn Quill1 96 or to "lobby" Congress to
act. 197 Regardless, Congress clearly has the power to act, and the only
remaining question is how to allow the states to collect sales taxes from
out-of-state retailers.
1.

The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: What is it and
is it Necessary?

The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) 98 is a
multistate agreement whose purpose is to "simplify and modernize sales
and use tax administration in the member states in order to substantially
reduce the burden of tax compliance," which was a primary concern
voiced by the Quill Court. 199 To achieve this goal, the SSUTA "focuses
on improving sales and use tax administration for all sellers and for all
types of commerce." 20 0 Currently, 44 states and the District of Columbia
have participated in creating this agreement, with 24 of those states
having passed laws to comply with the agreement. 2 1 The SSUTA is
voluntary and has no authority standing alone, as states must pass laws to
bring their sales and use tax laws into compliance with the SSUTA, and
sellers are not currently required to register under the SSUTA.202 In
196. Zelinsky, supra note 181, at 9-11 (stating that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
overturn Quill because (1) of procedural problems, (2) no decisions post-Quill have
indicated that the Court is likely to overturn Quill, and (3) Quill explicitly told the states
to look to Congress for the solution).
197. Zelinsky, supra note 121, at 2-3, 21-24 (arguing that Amazon laws signal to
Congress the need for federal legislation and provide political cover to lawmakers who
do not wish to appear to be "raising" taxes).
198.

For a more in-depth summary of the SSUTA, see HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,

supra note 25, 19A. This Comment only focuses on the basic aspects of the SSUTA.
199. STREAMLINED SALES TAX PROJECT, STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX
AGREEMENT § 102 (adopted Nov. 12, 2002, amended May 19, 2011), available at
http://bit.ly/JgWVFx [hereinafter SSUTA].

See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra

note 25,
19A.01-19A.02 for the historical background surrounding the SSUTA. See
Gamage & Heckman, supra note 18, at 500 (discussing the Quill Court's concern with
the burdens on out-of-state retailers).
200. SSUTA, supra note 199, § 102. The SSUTA focuses on the following areas for
simplification:
(1) state level administration of sales and use tax collections;
(2) uniformity in the state and local tax bases; (3) uniformity of major tax base
definitions; (4) central, electronic registration system for all member states;
(5) simplification of state and local tax rates; (6) uniform sourcing rules for all taxable
transactions; (7) simplified administration of exemptions; (8) simplified tax returns;
(9) simplification of tax remittances; and (10) protection of consumer privacy. Id.
201. Frequently Asked Questions, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC.,
http://bit.ly/dfuJEG (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
202. SSUTA, supra note 199, § 303; HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEN, supra note 25,
19A.03[1]. Once a seller registers under the SSUTA, it will be relieved of certain
liabilities, receive amnesty for uncollected or unpaid taxes, and become entitled to collect
higher compensation for tax collection obligations. SSUTA, supra note 199, §§ 303,
402, 601,603.
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to comply with the SSUTA,
order for states to require remote vendors
20 3
Congress must approve the compact.
Despite the overall successes of the SSUTA in simplifying state
sales tax laws and easing administrative burdens, it has not been without
criticism. Many out-of-state retailers, not surprisingly, do not approve of
the SSUTA because they will lose the price advantage they currently
enjoy by not collecting sales taxes.20 4 States also argue that technology
has greatly reduced the collection burden and, consequently, the need for
tax simplification and the SSUTA because software can be used to track
and compute the various tax rates in the thousands of taxing
jurisdictions. 20 5 E-retailers counter by claiming that
developing and
20 6
burdens.
significant
imposes
software
such
for
paying
Ultimately, the SSUTA has achieved a great deal of success, but has
not achieved the results many hoped it would. The SSUTA's biggest
problem is that retailers are not required to register under the SSUTA.2 °7
Congress has attempted several times to pass laws that grant approval to
the SSUTA, but none have been successful. 20 8 However, Congress is
currently considering several bills that either consent to the SSUTA or
require states to meet minimum simplification requirements before
imposing sales tax collection obligations on remote vendors.
2.

Will Congress Finally Act?

Three proposed bills have been introduced in Congress during the
112th session: the Main Street Fairness Act, 20 9 the Marketplace Equity
Act, 210 and the Marketplace Fairness Act.2 11 Each bill, if passed, would
authorize states to collect from out-of-state vendors; however, each bill
would impose different requirements that states must satisfy before
becoming authorized to collect from out-of-state vendors.

203.
204.
205.

See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the current bills that Congress is considering).
Ess, supra note 38 at 914-15.
Id. at 917; Zelinsky, supra note 121, at 23 (noting that "hybrid" vendors like

Staples or Walmart, which both run websites and brick-and-mortar stores, are able to
charge sales taxes without problem on online purchases).
206. See ConstitutionalLimitations on States' Authority to Collect Sales Taxes in ECommerce: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55-56 (2011)
(statement of Dr. Patrick M. Byrne, Chairman and CEO, Overstock.com, Inc.), available
at http://1.usa.gov/MIUHj3.
207. SSUTA, supra note 199, § 303; HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25,
19A.03[1].

208. Gaylord & Haile, supra note 43, at 2030. Consent from Congress is required in
order for the SSUTA to require remote vendors to register. Id.
209. Main Street Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. (2011).
210.

Marketplace Equity Act, H.R. 3179, 112th Cong. (2011).

211.

Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Under the Main Street Fairness Act of 2011, only states that are
fully compliant member states of the SSUTA would be able to collect
Additionally, the bill
sales taxes from out-of-state retailers.2 12
enumerates numerous "Minimum Simplification Requirements" that the
states must meet. 2 13 This bill is not a preferable solution, however,
because it prevents states that are not fully compliant with the SSUTA
While
from collecting sales taxes from out-of-state retailers.21 4
good
idea,
encouraging states to simplify their sales tax laws is a
preventing those states that choose not to completely comply with the
SSUTA from collecting sales taxes from out-of-state retailers is unfair to
those states. Consequently, the Main Street Fairness Act is an imperfect
solution.
The Marketplace Equity Act of 2011 takes almost the opposite
approach of the Main Street Fairness Act and attempts to allow all states
to collect sales taxes from out-of-state retailers. Instead of consenting to
the SSUTA, the bill would require states wishing to collect sales taxes
from out-of-state sellers to implement "a simplified system for
administration of sales and use tax collection., 21 5 These requirements
are different from those enumerated under the SSUTA and include the
following: a small seller exception, a tax return provided by the state to
be sent to a single state authority, clear definitions by the state of what
products are taxable, and the ability to charge out-of-state retailers one of
three different tax rates. 2 16 Once the state implements the above changes
and publishes a public notice as required by the bill, the state would be
allowed to collect sales taxes from out-of-state retailers. 1 7 The bill is an
improvement over the Main Street Fairness Act because it allows nonSSUTA compliant states to collect sales taxes from remote vendors.2 18
However, the simplification requirements under the Marketplace Equity
Act are not as stringent as those under the SSUTA and, notably, the bill
would not necessarily allow fully compliant states under the SSUTA to
collect sales taxes without further changes. 21 9 Accordingly, while the
212. S. 1452 § 4.
213. Id. § 6. These requirements are largely the same as required by the SSUTA. See
supra note 200 (listing the SSUTA simplification requirements); see generally SSUTA,
supra note 199.
214. S. 1452 § 4.
215. Marketplace Equity Act, H.R. 3179, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011).
216. Id.§ 2(b). The three rates are: (1) a single state-wide blended rate, (2) the
maximum state rate, or (3) the applicable destination rate. Id. § 2(b)(4)(A). The state
cannot charge a rate under (1) or (2) higher than that charged to local sellers. Id.
§ 2(b)(4)(C).
217. Id.§ 2(c).
218. Id.§ 2(a).
219. Sylvia F. Dion, The Marketplace Equity Act: The New Competition on the
Block, SALES TAX SUPPORT (Oct. 25, 2011), http://bit.ly/JqblEC (pointing out that states
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Marketplace Equity Act currently has greater bipartisan support, 220 it too
is an imperfect solution.
Finally, the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2011 represents a
compromise between the two previous bills. The bill authorizes fully
compliant states under the SSUTA to require remote vendors who do not
22
qualify for the small seller exception to collect and remit sales taxes. '
An alternative provision allows those states that have not fully complied
with the SSUTA to also be able to collect sales taxes from remote
sellers. 222 This alternate provision is similar to the Marketplace Equity
Act because it contains several simplification provisions that a state must
enact before the state can require a remote vendor to collect sales
taxes. 223 By requiring non-SSUTA compliant states to implement
minimum simplification requirements before collecting taxes from eretailers, this approach seems to be the "Goldilocks" bill. The bill
provides the "just right" balance in allowing states to collect sales taxes
from remote vendors without imposing too great a burden on those
sellers.
All three of the above bills have been referred to committee,
signifying that they are in the early stages of the legislative process and
that the bills' future is uncertain.224 This is not the first time that bills
have been introduced in Congress to give states the power to collect sales
taxes from remote sellers. 225 However, Congress seems more determined
to act this time, as indicated by the House Judiciary, Senate Finance, and
Senate Commerce Committees' decisions to hold hearings on November
30, 201 1,226 April 25, 2012,227 July 24, 2012,228 and August 1, 2012229 to

who could collect under the Main Street Fairness Act would not necessarily be the same
as those under the Marketplace Equity Act because the simplification requirements are
different).

220. Id.
221. Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
222. Id. § 3(b).
223. Id.
224. Sylvia F. Dion, Sales Tax Act-Main Street or Marketplace. Is SST Issue Key?,
SALES TAX SUPPORT (Dec. 22, 2011), http://bit.ly/rtRkdH (noting "[m]ost bills never
receive any committee consideration and are never reported out").
225. Similar bills in the past have failed to pass Congress. See, e.g., Main Street
Fairness Act, H.R. 5660, 111 th Cong. (2010).

226. Constitutional Limitations on States' Authority to Collect Sales Taxes in ECommerce: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l2th Cong. (2011),
available at http://1.usa.gov/MIUHj3.

227.

Tax Reform:

Hearing Before the

What It Means for State and Local Tax and Fiscal Policy:
S.

Comm.

on

Fin.,

112th

Cong.

(2012),

available at

http://bit.ly/KFa6SO (discussing state tax law reform in general).
228. H.R. 3179, the "MarketplaceEquity Act of 2011 ": HearingBefore the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012), availableat http://l.usa.gov/MSbpZU.
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discuss the currently proposed bills. Despite some disagreements, 230 the
consensus of Congress appears to be towards action, though
Representative John Conyers, a sponsor of the Main Street Fairness Act,
231
admitted that his bill "isn't perfect" and "can be improved.,
Nevertheless, based on this increased committee activity,
the likelihood
232
past.
the
in
than
greater
seems
action
of Congressional
VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE ANSWER?

Despite being 20 years old, the Quill decision remains the law of the
land and is still applicable to the world of e-commerce. That does not
mean the result is always fair, as "pure" e-retailers like Amazon have
stretched Quill to its extreme limits. Although states are looking for any
means through which to collect sales taxes from out-of-state retailers,
passing Amazon laws to force remote e-retailers to collect and remit
sales taxes is not the proper solution.
Even if Amazon's challenge to the New Yoik Amazon law reaches
the United States Supreme Court, and even if the Court decides to uphold
the law as constitutional, most states would still be unable to collect sales
taxes from pure e-retailers like Amazon. Amazon has shown that it is
willing to cancel its Associates program to avoid collecting sales taxes,
and, without that program, the state will be again unable to collect sales
taxes from the e-retailer.233 Colorado's approach is unique and more
effective in some ways, but raises a host of other issues that place this
version of the Amazon law on shaky constitutional ground. Arguably
Oklahoma' approach is the least controversial, but is conversely the least
effective. 34 Despite these problems and issues, states will likely
continue to pass Amazon laws.
229.

Marketplace Fairness:

Leveling the Playing Field for Small Businesses:

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 112th Cong. (2012), available at
http://1 .usa.gov/Plecyn.
230. Generally, opponents to the three bills claim that imposing sales tax collection
obligations will stifle e-commerce by imposing high burdens on small start-up businesses
and therefore argue for a high small business exception. Bernie Becker, Reid: I'll 'Do
Everything I Can' for Online Sales Tax, THE HILL (Jul. 24, 2012, 8:04 AM),
http://bit.ly/STNmy9. Opponents also argue that the bills will impose a new tax on
consumers and that the technology does not exist to calculate the appropriate sales tax in
the 9,600 taxing jurisdictions. Grant Gross, Supporters of Online Sales Tax Say It's Good
for Consumers, PC WORLD (Jul. 24, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://bit.ly/MGURHP. See also
supra Part V.B. 1 (discussing arguments against the SSUTA).
231. Becker, supra note 227.
232. At the July 24, 2012 House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative Bob
Goodlatte stated "[i]t may not be the beginning of the end but it may be the end of the
beginning." Siobhan Hughes, Online Sales Tax Effort Gains Traction at US House
Hearing,WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://on.wsj.com/MHVZsl.
233. Gamage & Heckman, supra note 18, at 485.
234. See supra Part V.A.2.
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While states may keep trying to force remote vendors to collect
sales taxes, resolution of this issue has and always will be an area on
which Congress has the ultimate authority to decide. The United States
Supreme Court could also overturn Quill, but it is unlikely that the Court
will do so based on the Court's language that Congress should resolve
the issue and the Court's unwillingness to take action over the last 20
years. Congress seems motivated to act at this time, with increased
pressure from states demanding the power to collect the sales taxes that
pure e-retailers owe the states. Ultimately, the best answer to this
problem is to authorize states who have complied with the SSUTA to
require remote vendors to collect and remit sales taxes, while also
allowing states who comply with some level of minimum simplification
standards to do the same. Although e-retailers will continue resisting the
Amazon laws, it seems inevitable that out-of-state e-retailers will be
required to collect and remit sales taxes to states in the near future. The
only remaining questions are when and under what circumstances.

